A Strategy for Civil War?

Ceremony for ANA graduation in summer 2004. Left to right, former warlord Sherzai now Governor of Nangarhar Province; Defense Minister Fahim now Karzai's current Vice-President; Rahim Wardak, Karzai's current Defense Minister; General Besmellah Khan, Deputy Minister of Defense; Ebrahim, Advisor for the Ministry of Defense.

Over the past five years, one showpiece held up by US and Coalition forces is the Afghan National Army (ANA). The opinion is they have more integrity and potential for defending Afghanistan than the corrupt, poorly paid, illiterate Afghan National Police (ANP). Obama’s plan has included the ANA as a keystone for defending the borders of Afghanistan. If the Afghans can have a reasonable sense of security then the US and Coalition forces can transfer security and go home.

Now facts are emerging that the ANA may in fact be groundwork for future instability and civil war.
Back in the summer of 2004, when training centers manufactured ANA soldiers by the hundreds, the ethnic composition was a concern. Even though the ANA was dictated to have a balanced mix of ethnic groups (38% being Pashtun and 25% Tajiks, 19% Hazaras and 8% Uzbek) during a graduation ceremony at an ANA training facility, that mix was absent. The majority of the recruits spoke no Pashto despite being assigned to Kandahar Province, a predominately Pashtun region.

Ironically, presiding over the graduation ceremony, was the sorcerer behind this magic—then Defense Minister Mohammed Qasim Fahim now Vice-President of Afghanistan and the one to inherit the power if Karzai were assassinated.

Marshal Fahim has packed the ANA with his Tajiks and other anti-Pashtun ethnics stacking the pieces for a civil war. Tajiks don’t trust Pashtuns because of their affiliation with the Taliban in the south.

The residents of Kabul, the center of government, also fear civil war. In the weeks following the notorious election farce, when Tajik candidate Dr. Abdullah was forced into a corner, anxiety was high. Each morning as gunfire erupted, residents would watch as blast walls were installed around government Ministries—for riot control and not car bombs. Rumors clogged the air of stockpiles of weapons in the Panjshir Valley. A deeply buried angst of a Tajik uprising spread throughout the city.

Now adding to this dread is the Tajik dominance and the turnover rate within the ANA where one in every four combat soldiers quits. The numbers indicate a rate of turnover increasing rather than slowing down.

Even prominent Afghan military leaders are concerned about the composition of the ANA ranks. Former communist-era Afghan General Amarullah Aman says “The Afghan military is dominated by cadres from past warring factions who sometimes see the creation of a professional military as going against their personal interests.

Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak who warns of other influences rather than Tajik dominance and to be "very watchful because we do have reports that [insurgents] are really trying to infiltrate.”

Marshal Fahim is a survivor. He gained a reputation as a strong and reliable leader while fighting for Ahmad Shah Massoud during the war with the Soviets. However he has also been accused of being trained and working for the Soviets in Moscow before the Soviet invasion. Even his history with Karzai is puzzling. In 1994, as National Chief of Security in the Mujaheddin government he arrested and brutally interrogated Karzai on suspicion of being a spy for Pakistani intelligence. Yet now, Karzai has chosen him for Vice-president.

Fahim knows how to play all sides against each other and look like a cooperative partner. A truly oriental way of thinking ,and historical Afghan strategy, that keeps Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability for centuries.

- by Janet Killeen

If you want to read more on the ANA, go to The Long War Journal’s report on the Afghan National Army Order of Battle.