Afghanistan is Not Iraq.

Afghanistan is not Iraq. Nor is it Vietnam. It is not even the same country the Soviets fought during the 80’s. Yet American officials keep looking back at Iraq hoping to cut and paste successful campaigns into the conflict in Afghanistan.

The Community Defense Initiative, their newest idea, plans to nationalize tribal militias to fight Taliban insurgents. This initiative emerged after tribal elders independently organized and pushed the Taliban out of their provinces in Nangarhar and Paktia. The NY Times describes reasoning behind this initiative:

By harnessing the militias, American and Afghan officials hope to rapidly increase the number of Afghans fighting the Taliban. … help fill the gap while the Afghan Army and police forces train and grow—a project that could take years to bear fruit.

There are flaws in this idea which need to be addressed before becoming too optimistic.

Flaw #1: Civil War.

Afghanistan may not be on the verge of civil war but pieces are set in place for one. During the weeks surrounding the fraudulent Presidential election, rumors flooded Kabul of weapons being stockpiled in the Panjshir Valley and outside the city. Fact or fiction, the rumors reveal a blood and tissue anxiety in the Afghan mind of another civil war. Giving weight to the rumors is the increase in car bombs, firefights and rocket attacks—not all credited to the Taliban. Then there is the return of the warlord Dostum brought back to offset Dr. Abdullah’s powerbase in the north. These rumors and events combined with last week’s failed assassination of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a powerful, reclusive warlord from the 90’s, suggest a power struggle playing out in the capital. At a critical time, when the strength of the central government is in question, sanctioning the use of tribal militias will pave a familiar path to another civil war.

Flaw #2: Baby, Where’s My Gun?

Since 2002, the country has gone through various stages of disarmament. Large sums have been paid to warlords to disband their militias with the militias themselves paid to surrender their guns and join the ANA. Now it is discovered much of the money given was used by the strongmen and their militias to upgrade and restock their caches of weapons.

Flaw #3: Rats in the Nest­­.

Warlords. They destroyed their own country after the Soviets withdrew contributing to the rise of the Taliban. Fearful these warlords would fight the new Afghan government, Karzai’s brought them into the government hoping for their cooperation. Instead they used the opportunity to build up personal wealth and institutionalize corruption. Blocking their meddling and control of the new tribal militias would prove to be difficult and fracture what little unity exists.

Flaw #4: Pashtunistan... oops, I mean Pakistan.

On the verge of their own civil war, Pakistanis are fearful of the unification of Pashtuns in the regions bordering Afghanistan—a border most Pashtuns do not observe. Sanctioning their use of militias would anger the Pakistani government possibly causing a reaction such as training and arming groups like the Taliban.

Flaw #5: 30 Years of War and We're Tired.

Afghans are weary of conflict and discord. Security is their main desire and only demand from their government. Nation building is the mantra for reconstruction projects of the Coalition throughout Afghanistan “show how it is the central government and not the Coalition who is building these new roads and schools.” By putting the responsibility of security back on the tribes does this not dilute the Coalition’s main mission?

Flaw #6: Didn’t We Try this Before?

Americans trained and armed the mujahidin to defeat the Soviets and then afterwards, when we lost interest and giddy over the dotcom boom in the 90’s, we withdrew our support creating conditions for civil war. When we leave Afghanistan again what happens to these militias?

Flaw #7: The Big Pink Elephant in the Room.

Opium. Millions of dollars are profited in the growing, trading, processing, and trafficking of the Afghanistan’s opium. Militias and wars cost money and opium is a lucrative source of funds tribal militias die and kill to control.

Flaw #8: The Real Problem – the ANP.

The urgent push to standup the ANP in a few short years created a police force the population fears. They are known to bully, extort and rob. It is not entirely the policeman’s fault—he is underpaid, illiterate and poor. Often forced to give his new weapon and ammunition to his superiors, he is still expected to sacrifice his life to stop a suicide bomber from running a checkpoint.

Instead of taking full responsibility for the failure of the ANP program, American and Afghan officials are shifting responsibility—and cost—back to the tribes. Pressuring the Afghans to take responsibility for security is correct but rebuilding a nation takes time. Special Forces are experts at empowering indigenous groups to fight insurgency—let the long beards do their job. To bring the plan into Afghanistan’s national security plan though would be ruinous. Isn't thirty years of war long enough?