An ANP Slumber Party
“I support, I support, as long as you put BULLSHIT, BULLSHIT in very large letters at the end.”
Hawk is tired.
He is at the end of his year-long deployment in Afghanistan serving as a mentor along from the 1st Squadron, 108th Cavalry Regiment of the 48th Brigade in the Georgia Army National Guard.
Yet, the commander is voicing what many mentors are feeling across Afghanistan—the Afghans are not taking responsibility for securing their country.
Tonight we are sleeping inside the armored vehicles behind the walls of an ANP compound. By staying overnight, Hawk’s team shows support for the ANP, and as an added bonus, give the Taliban a well-armed American presence.
Hawk’s team is part of the Embed Training Team (ETT) program for the Afghan Security Forces. The Americans eat, sleep and work alongside the Afghan forces, training them to be professionals in the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP) or the Afghan National Army (ANA).
The compound is located in Kot district, in Nangarhar province near the volatile AfPak border. The district is a rarity; it is overseen by an honest Police Chief and Subgovernor. It is also grossly understaffed with only 50 ANP for a population over 150,000.
The next morning, Hawk's team will hike up steep hillsides to two ANP outposts overlooking the compound. They will guide two Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters where to drop Hescos and concertina wire. In 2009 the Taliban attacked from these hillsides down into the ANP compound below. The two outposts are now being reinforced by the Americans.
After our return to FOB Hughie, I went to talk to Sgt. 1st class Hawke and Staff Sgt. Roberson about the training and mentoring program. They were methodically cleaning their weapons in the warm, midday sun.
“It is not sticking, they need more training,” says Hawk. Tall and muscular, with a hint of gray, he oversees his command with a mixture of ease and worry.
“Their shooting skills are just 'point the gun and spray gunfire'. My teenage daughter could shoot better than the ANP.”
In Kot, Kapisa and outside Kabul, Hawk and the 108th spent long hours working with the Afghans on maintaining weapons, in target practice, walking alongside on dismounts and teaching basic police skills. Hawk respects the Afghans and put great effort showing the men professional, life-saving skills.
Yet, the Afghans are not showing improvement.
“The training is not long enough,” says Roberson. In his civilian life he is a police officer working the tough neighborhoods of Atlanta. Roberson is square jawed, square shouldered and towers over everyone.
“In Atlanta police training is 36 weeks long, here it is 8 weeks.”
What Roberson didn’t mention is last year ten thousand recruits received only three weeks training because of a push to increase numbers.
“There are not enough trainers,” Roberson continues.
ISAF has provided only 37% of the required trainers to reach target police levels by summer 2011.
Hawk and Roberson can easily identify the underlining flaws in the ANP training program; they are both proof of the quality and expertise the National Guard brings to the Afghanistan conflict. They believe parts of the problem are unrealistic mentoring ratios and a lack of an NCO class.
Whereas with the ANA a 10:1 mentor ratio can get excellent results, with police you're often talking a 2:1 ratio.
Roberson found the lack of NCOs as a contributing factor for the poor performance of the ANP. Many Afghan officers were previously trained using the Soviet model which does not use a NCO grade. In the American model, NCOs are essential to providing sound, reliable leadership.
Marine Lt. Col. Kenney, another ETT working the Nangarhar area, worked as a mentor for the Iraqi Security Forces. He has another explanation for the Afghans not being proactive in securing their country.
“Where the Iraqis were like traumatized children, the Afghans have spent the last thirty years fighting. They won’t fight till they have to—when we leave.”
Having a trustworthy, robust police force is crucial in the fight against the Taliban; it is essential for “Hold” and “Build” elements of counterinsurgency (COIN).
If the Afghan forces are to take responsibility for their own security by 2012, a deadline outlined in Obama’s AfPak strategy, fundamental changes will need to be implemented quickly.
The overnight ANP mentoring has produced one positive benefit—IED incidents in the Kot area have dropped. In the near future more mentors will be spending nights in ANP posts across Afghanistan.
In the meantime, Hawk and Roberson need not worry. In the next twenty days their deployment will be over. They and the rest of the 108th are ‘ripping-out’ and heading back to Georgia.
Here are more 2009 ANP statistics not fit for a recruiting poster.
- Between 2007 and 2009 the ANP suffered 1,504, ‘Killed in Action’—triple the casualty rates of the Afghan Army
- The ANP annual attrition rate was 20%
- A patrolman’s base wage is $165 per month; up from $70 per month
- ANP total force is believed to be 76,000; their target strength is 123,000
- Finally 75% of police recruits are illiterate
